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I. INTRODUCTION

This Article explores the relationship between the National Basketball
Association (“NBA”), its independently-owned teams, and associated corporate
entities; including the Women’s NBA (“WNBA”), NBA Properties, NBA
Developmental League (“D-League”), NBA China, and single entity analysis under
section 1 of the Sherman Act. 1 Section 1 chiefly aims to prevent competitors from
combining their economic power in ways that unduly impair competition or harm
consumers, be it in terms of raised prices, diminished quality, or limited choices.
Single entities are exempt from section 1 scrutiny because they are considered “one,”
rather than competitors, and thus their collaboration does not implicate anticompetitive concerns. Although single entity status has traditionally been limited to
parents and their wholly owned subsidiaries, recent decisions suggest that other
business arrangements may enjoy single entity status.
In American Needle v. NFL, 2 for which the Court heard oral arguments on January
13, 2010, the Supreme Court will decide whether the National Football League
(“NFL”), its teams, and associated corporate entities, constitute a single entity. Other
leagues, including the NBA, may be impacted by the Court’s decision, which is
expected by the summer of 2010. If the NBA gained single entity status, it could
potentially execute exclusive contracts with video game companies and apparel
companies, restrain players’ salaries and employment autonomy, and impose
heightened age restrictions on amateur players who seek employment in the NBA, all
without concern for section 1 scrutiny.
In a recent feature in the Yale Law Journal, I discourage the Court from
recognizing the NFL as a single entity but recommend that Congress consider
targeted, sports league-related exemptions from section 1. 3 In this Article, I survey
whether the NBA’s globalized business agenda and the league’s exposure to
competition from foreign professional basketball leagues necessitate that NBA teams
act in unison and with a “shared consciousness.” 4 The necessity of cooperation, at
least for certain international endeavors, may distinguish NBA teams from teams in
the NFL and possibly those in the two other “Big Four” professional sports
leagues—Major League Baseball (“MLB”) and the National Hockey League
(“NHL”) 5 —which remain more anchored to domestic operations. To the extent
1 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). Section 1 provides, in relevant part, that “Every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” Id.
2 174 L. Ed. 2d 575 (2009).
3 See Michael A. McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity to Reshape Sports Law, 119
YALE L.J. 726 (2010) [hereinafter McCann, An Opportunity to Reshape Sports Law].
4 “Shared consciousness,” in the context of professional sports leagues, refers to a symbiotic
arrangement between a league and its teams. The arrangement exists because it maximizes
business interests and promotes the league’s sustainability. Id. at 751.
5 N. Am. Soccer v. Nat’l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1253 (2d Cir. 1982) (classifying the
NFL, NBA, MLB, and NHL as the “major” professional sports leagues). As a point of
context, Major League Baseball already enjoys a limited exemption from section 1, but the
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Congress considers legislative exemptions for professional sports leagues, the
experience of the NBA, a trailblazer in promoting a league product abroad, may lend
insight on how antitrust law should regulate leagues in the years ahead.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE NBA AND ITS OPERATIONS
A. The NBA and Its Associated Leagues
The NBA began in 1949 as an unincorporated association of twelve privately
owned teams. 6 As is often the case with nascent leagues, the NBA’s early years were
turbulent, with modest attendance and several teams folding soon after their
formation. 7 The league stayed afloat in part because franchise owners ceded a great
deal of authority to the league’s first commissioner, Maurice Podoloff, an attorney
with a proficiency in marketing and advertising, 8 and because those owners realized
that their collective and individual success depended on unity. 9
The league’s fortunes would improve in the 1960s. Propelled by Bill Russell, Wilt
Chamberlain, Bob Cousy, and other marketable stars, as well as a national television
contract with ABC, the NBA became a nationally-relevant sports league. 10 In the
following decades, other popular players, most notably Larry Bird, Magic Johnson,
and Michael Jordan, would help the NBA become one of the “big four” professional
leagues. Franchise values have soared in the last three decades: the average price of an
NBA franchise increased from $12 million in 1983 to $114 million in 1993 to $200

exemption does not extend to matters impacting players’ employment conditions and may not
extend to licensing. See McCann, An Opportunity to Reshape Sports Law, supra note 3, at 771–72.
6 See Michael A. McCann, Illegal Defense: The Irrational Economics of Banning High School Players from
the NBA Draft, 3 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 113, 117 (2004).
7 See GEORGE W. SCULLY, THE MARKET STRUCTURE FOR SPORTS 16–18 (1995); PAUL C.
WEILER, LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: HOW LAW CAN MAKE SPORTS BETTER FOR FANS
236 (2000).
8 See WALTER LAFEBER, MICHAEL JORDAN AND THE NEW GLOBAL CAPITALISM 40 (2002).
9 See Colin J. Daniels & Aaron Brooks, From the Black Sox to the Sky Box: The Evolution and
Mechanics of Commissioner Authority, 10 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 23, 28–29 (2009); see also
PAUL D. STAUDOHAR, PLAYING FOR DOLLARS: LABOR RELATIONS AND THE SPORTS
BUSINESS 103 (1996) (noting that Podoloff receives credit for “holding the league together in
the difficult early years”).
10 See WILLIAM JOSEPH BAKER, SPORTS IN THE WESTERN WORLD 317 (1988).
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million in 1999 and to $367 million in 2009. 11 The NBA is also considered the most
successful U.S. sports league overseas in attracting fans and their money. 12
David Stern, who has served as NBA commissioner since 1984, deserves
considerable credit for the league’s success.
Widely regarded as a savvy
businessperson, Stern has generated significant fan interest in the NBA’s product and
has earned the trust of NBA owners. 13 Indeed, in generating $3.2 billion a year in
revenue, 14 the NBA is undoubtedly the world’s leading basketball league. 15 To be
sure, Stern’s leadership style—described by some as “dictatorial” or “autocratic”—has
received criticism, 16 but his leadership has resulted in a highly successful league.
In recent years, the NBA has expanded its business operations to include new
basketball leagues that, though distinct, remain under the control of Stern and the
NBA. The WNBA is perhaps most illustrative. Founded in 1996 as a subsidiary of
the NBA, the WNBA currently features twelve teams, half of which are owned by
NBA teams, with the other half owned by persons who lack equity in NBA teams. 17
As a result, the WNBA is a partially owned, rather than wholly owned, subsidiary of
the NBA. The NBA devised the WNBA with the stated purpose of embodying a
See DANIEL R. MARBURGER, STEE-RIKE FOUR!: WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE BUSINESS OF
BASEBALL? 99 (1997) (noting average value of NBA franchises in 1983 and 1993); Jeffrey E.
Garten, The NBA Needs to do Some Globetrotting, BUS. WK., July 19, 1999, at 19 (noting average
value of NBA franchises in 1999); Kurt Badenhausen, The Business of Basketball, FORBES.COM,
Dec. 9, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/12/09/nba-basketball-valuations-businesssports-basketball-values-09-intro.html (noting average value of NBA franchises in 2009).
12 See Richard Sandomir, NFL Pulls Plug on its Own League in Europe, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2007,
at D1.
13 See Jimmy Smith, Silver Salute, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 1, 2009, at Sports 1; see also, THOMAS
L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 297 (2000) (discussing how Stern has
understood and exploited the globalization of commerce); BERNARD JAMES MULLIN ET AL.,
SPORTS MARKETING 2 (2007) (describing “brilliant” marketing ideas of Stern).
14 See Sports Industry Overview, PLUNKETT RESEARCH, http://www.plunkettresearch.com/
Industries/Sports/SportsStatistics/tabid/273/Default.aspx (last visited Jan. 26, 2010)
(comparing favorably NBA revenue to revenue generated by four major sports leagues).
15 See Harlem Wizards Entm’t Basketball, Inc. v. NBA Props., 952 F. Supp. 1084, 1086 (D.N.J.
1997) (describing the NBA as “the world's preeminent professional basketball league”); Hall v.
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 651 F. Supp. 335, 336 (D. Kan. 1987) (“The NBA and its member
teams comprise the premier professional basketball league in the United States.”).
16 See, e.g., Dan Patrick, Just My Type, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 23, 2008, at 28 (quoting
Ralph Nader, who calls Stern “autocratic”); King Kaufman, Sports Daily, SALON.COM, May 16,
2007,
http://www.salon.com/sports/col/kaufman/2007/05/16/wednesday/index.html
(describing Stern as a “dictator”); see also Sekou Smith, NBA’s Savior or Dictator?, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Dec. 5, 2004, at 4C (examining the competing arguments concerning Stern’s leadership
style).
17 See Ben Collins, Trying to Ensure a Bright Future, BOSTON GLOBE, June 6, 2009, at 1; WNBA
Enterprises, LLC, BUS. WK., http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/
snapshot.asp?privcapId=28093080 (last visited Jan. 26, 2010); Mark Bechtel et. al, For the
Record, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 30, 2009, at 22 (noting that Sacramento Monarchs folded
in November 2009, reducing the number of WNBA teams from thirteen to twelve).
11
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completely centralized entity, with league ownership of teams and with WNBA
players subject to rules unilaterally imposed by the WNBA. 18 In 2002, however,
WNBA players chose to unionize and, as mentioned above, the league now has
individualized ownership groups. 19 The WNBA and NBA nonetheless remain closely
connected, with league offices housed in the same building in New York City and
with frequent collaboration on marketing and sponsorship arrangements. 20
The NBA’s recent investment in minor league basketball is also indicative of an
expanding league. In 2001, the NBA created the D-League in order to provide a
minor league for NBA teams and their players. 21 Though thirteen of the sixteen DLeague teams are independently owned, 22 the NBA by and large controls D-League
operations, and most NBA teams share D-League teams for purposes of player
development. 23
NBA China is a similar extension of the NBA’s business model, which is based
on approximately 10% of league revenues being generated outside the U.S. 24 Formed
in 2008, NBA China is a partially owned subsidiary of the NBA, with minority
interests held by ESPN and several financial institutions. 25 The NBA and its teams
18 See LISA PIKE MASTERALEXIS ET AL., PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF SPORT MANAGEMENT
208 (2008); GLENN M. WONG, THE COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO CAREERS IN SPORTS 78
(2008); Edward Mathias, Comment, Big League Perestrokia? The Implications of Fraser v. Major
League Soccer, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 203, 221–22 n.107 (1999).
19 See Marc Edelman & C. Keith Harrison, Analyzing the WNBA's Mandatory Age/Education
Policy from a Legal, Cultural, and Ethical Perspective: Women, Men, and the Professional Sports Landscape,
3 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 9 (2008) (discussing unionization of WNBA players); Lacie L.
Kaiser, The Flight from Single-Entity Structured Sport Leagues, 2 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1, 11 (2005) (discussing WNBA movement away from a single entity structure).
20 See WONG, supra note 18, at 78.
21 In addition to developing players, the D-League is also designed to provide coaches,
trainers, and other officials with experience in professional basketball. See Barry Lewis, Tulsa
Adds New Professional Basketball Franchise, TULSA WORLD, Mar. 22, 2005, at B1.
22 See Ron Chimelis, Armor’s Milligan Out, REPUBLICAN, Dec. 10, 2009, at B01 (noting that only
three D-League teams are owned by NBA teams).
23 See Mike Baldwin, Owning 66ers Benefits Thunder, OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 22, 2009, at 6B; Steve
Carp, Fan Turnout Strong for Summer League, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., July 20, 2009, at 1C. Although
the NBA dictates the D-League’s policies and procedures, thirteen of the sixteen D-League
teams are owned by local owners, with only three D-League teams owned by NBA teams. See
Mike Snider, Snide Remarks, NBA.COM, Mar. 10, 2009, at http://www.nba.com/dleague/
idaho/Stampede_Blog.html.
24 See Mark Leftly, Basketball Takes a Shot Across The Pond, INDEP., Oct. 11, 2009, at 82.
25 NBA Announces Formation of NBA China, Jan. 14, 2008, NBA.COM, http://www.nba.com/
news/nba_china_080114.html; see also FRANK P. JOZSA, JR., GLOBAL SPORTS: CULTURES,
MARKETS AND ORGANIZATIONS 92 (2008) (discussing how NBA China evaluates, initiates,
and controls the NBA’s image in China); Sports Leagues Go Global, METROPOLITAN CORP.
COUNS., Feb. 2008, at 6 (providing comments by Jon Oram, a partner at Proskauer Rose and
attorney for the NBA, on ownership and management structure of NBA China and NBA’s
investment in China); Adam Thompson & Alan Paul, NBA Uses Local Allure to Push Planned
League in China, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2008, at B1 (providing additional detail on NBA China).
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have quickly, and considerably, invested in marketing NBA-sponsored basketball to
Chinese consumers. From 2004 to 2009, the NBA opened offices in Beijing,
Shanghai, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, and the number of full-time NBA employees
based in China increased from three to more than 145. 26 Also, working alongside the
Chinese government and sports complex developers, the NBA expects to build up to
twelve NBA-style arenas across China. 27
China reflects a sensible locale for league expansion, as it is the NBA’s largest
market outside of the United States, contributing approximately 30% of the NBA’s
international income. 28 The NBA expects that NBA China will generate significant
revenue and that it, along with an increasing presence of international players in the
NBA, 29 will serve as a trend-setter in the NBA’s global ambitions. 30
B. The NBA and Its Relationship with the NBPA
Since the formation of the league, NBA players have been aware of their
contributions to the league’s financial success. They have also been aware that when
compared to individual teams, the league, and players in general, star NBA players
tend to generate disproportionate revenue for the NBA. 31 Naturally, NBA players
have demanded compensation for their contributions. To advance those demands,
NBA players formed a union, the National Basketball Players’ Association (NBPA), in
1954. 32 The NBPA serves as the exclusive bargaining representative of all NBA
See John Reid, China is Becoming a New Hoops Frontier, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 20, 2009, at
Sports 1.
27 See David Barboza, China Offers Fertile Ground for Branding, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 8, 2009,
at 23. While China contributes 30% of the income received by the NBA through international
sources, only 10% of the NBA’s total revenue derives from international sources. See Leftly,
supra note 24 (noting that 10% of total NBA revenue derives from international sources).
28 See Samantha Marshall, NBA’s Big Plans Hinge on Beijing, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS., July 7, 2008, at
3.
29 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 297 (discussing the NBA’s use of global commerce to
expand its product); GIORGIO GANDOLFI, NBA COACHES PLAYBOOK: TECHNIQUES,
TACTICS, AND TEACHING POINTS 135 (2008) (noting that nearly 20% of NBA players were
born outside of the U.S.); Benjamin Hochman, NBA Teams Continue to Look Outside U.S.,
TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 21, 2004, at Sports 2 (discussing increase in percentage of international
players in the NBA).
30 Michael Lee, The NBA in China: Opening a Super Market, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2007, at A1.
31 To illustrate, such legendary stars as Michael Jordan, Larry Bird, and LeBron James have
been shown to significantly increase ticket sales, including for away games. See ANDREW
ZIMBALIST, THE ECONOMICS OF SPORT 569 (2001). Also consider that during the 1990s,
items associated with the Chicago Bulls and Michael Jordan accounted for nearly half of NBA
Properties’ revenue. Id. at 575. Star NBA players are thus considered irreplaceable or
extremely difficult to replace. See SCOTT ROSNER & KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE, THE BUSINESS
OF SPORTS 204 (2004).
32 See Paul A. Fortenberry & Brian E. Hoffman, Illegal Muscle: A Comparative Analysis of Proposed
Steroid Legislation and the Policies in Professional Sports’ CBAs That Led to the Steroid Controversy, 5 VA.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 121, 131 (2006).
26
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players and negotiates a bevy of employment related conditions, including the league’s
salary structure, rules of conduct, and procedures for discipline. 33
Negotiation between the NBA and NBPA is crucial for the league’s success and
for the league’s capacity to avoid antitrust rebuke. Namely, by collectively bargaining
rules with the NBPA, the NBA ensures that those rules are exempt from section 1 of
the Sherman Act. Section 1 bars collaborations by competitors—in this context,
NBA teams—that unduly harm competition and consumers. 34 The exemption from
section 1 derives from the non-statutory labor exemption, which was borne from
several Supreme Court decisions 35 and dictates that if a bargained rule concerns a
mandatory subject of bargaining (most notably, players’ salaries and working
conditions) 36 and primarily affects the owners and players (as opposed to third
parties, like media), it is exempt from section 1 scrutiny. 37 Rules unilaterally imposed
by the NBA, in contrast, are subject to section 1 scrutiny, which has invalidated a
number of unilaterally-imposed NBA rules, perhaps most notably in the context of
age eligibility restrictions. 38
The relationship between the NBA and NBPA has seen its highs and lows. Its
nadir occurred in 1998, when the two bargaining units were unable to agree on
revisions to the structure of players’ salaries. 39 The lack of agreement prompted the
See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Nat’l Basketball Players Ass’n, No. 04 Civ. 9528, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 26244 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2005) (describing the NBPA as the “exclusive bargaining
representative of all NBA players”). For background on the types of rules bargained for by
the NBPA, see NBPA.com, About the NBPA, http://www.nbpa.com/about_nbpa.php (last
visited, Jan. 27, 2010).
34 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (providing in pertinent part: “Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”). For professional
sports, section 1 scrutiny normally involves rule of reason, which entails a weighing of proand anti-competitive effects. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 235–38 (1996)
(explaining that it would be difficult and illogical to exclude all “competition-restricting
agreements” from collective bargaining); see also Five Smiths, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League
Players Ass’n, 788 F. Supp. 1042, 1045 (D. Minn. 1992) (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) for discussion on rule of reason).
35 See Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea
Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689 (1965); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 664–65
(1965).
36 See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League (Clarett I), 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 392–93 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
37 See Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 623 (8th Cir. 1976).
38 Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 1971). For a
discussion of Denver Rockets, see Nicholas E. Wurth, The Legality of an Age-Requirement in the
National Basketball League After the Second Circuit’s Decision in Clarett v. NFL, 3 DEPAUL J.
SPORTS L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 109–11 (2005). A collectively-bargained rule, however, is
exempt from section 1 analysis. See, e.g., Wood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir.
1987) (holding that while a salary cap would normally violate section 1 because of its anticompetitive effects, it is exempt from section 1 analysis if collectively-bargained).
39 For a helpful overview of the NBA lockout, see Bertrand-Marc Allen, “Embedded Contract
Unionism” in Play—Examining the Intersection of Individual and Collective Contracting in the National
33
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NBA to lock out the players. 40 The lockout lasted from July 1998 to January 1999,
when the NBPA acquiesced to most of the NBA’s demands. 41 Popularity in the
NBA suffered as a result of the lockout. 42 Similar fallout could be experienced next
year. Although there remains considerable time for negotiations with the NBPA, the
NBA has until December 15, 2010 to decide to extend the current collective
bargaining agreement into the 2011–12 season. 43 For a variety of reasons, the league
will probably not extend the CBA, meaning the NBA could lockout the players in
2011. 44
A more constructive era in the relationship between the NBA and NBPA
occurred during the early 1980s. At the time, the NBA was experiencing financial
woes caused in part by player payroll disparities among wealthier and less affluent
clubs.45 In order to mollify these disparities, NBA owners sought, and obtained
through collective bargaining, a cap on team payrolls (“salary cap”). 46 The 1983
collective bargaining agreement included such a cap, which restricted the aggregate
salaries paid by each NBA team to its players. 47 The salary cap has remained a feature
of subsequent collective bargaining agreements and is generally considered to have
promoted competitiveness and parity. 48 The NBPA has acceded to a cap in part
Basketball Association, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1, 6–15 (2002); see also Phil Taylor & Jackie MacMullan,
To the Victor Belongs the Spoils, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 18, 1999, at 48 (describing NBA
Commissioner David Stern as “w[inning] a landmark victory” and obtaining most of his
demands).
40 See Allen, supra note 39, at 10.
41 Id. at 11.
42 See James B. Perrine, Media Leagues: Australia Suggests New Professional Sports Leagues for the
Twenty-First Century, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 703, 750 (2002) (discussing impact of lockout
on viewership of NBA games).
43 See Chris Colston, Marathon Season Takes Toll, USA TODAY, Apr. 30, 2009, at 1C.
44 Id.; see also Frank Hughes, NBA Expected to Take Hard Line in First Proposal to Union for New
CBA, SI.com, Jan. 29, 2010, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/frank_hughes/
01/29/labor.strife/index.html?eref=sihp (detailing demands of the NBA, which expects major
economic concessions from the NBPA in the next CBA). As a technical matter, the current
collective bargaining agreement contains no strike/no lockout provisions, meaning a lockout
could not occur until the agreement expires. See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n Collective Bargaining
Agreement, art. XXX, § 1–2, available at http://www.nbpa.org/sites/default/files/
ARTICLE%20XXX.pdf
45 See Fran Blinebury, Channel Surfing Won’t be Enough, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 16, 1994, Sports, at
1.
46 See Alan M. Levine, Hard Cap or Soft Cap: The Optimal Player Mobility Restrictions for the
Professional Sports Leagues, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 243, 289 (1995)
(discussing how the NBA was on the “brink of financial ruin”).
47 See Bappa Mukherji, The New NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement: The Changing Role of Agents in
Professional Basketball, 2 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 96, 97 (2000).
48 See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 686 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting continued
presence of the salary cap in CBAs between the NBA and NBPA); Tim Brown, Still a Dynasty,
or Dead Ringers?, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2002, at Sports 1 (noting that the NBA’s salary cap has
enjoyed some success in promoting a more competitive product).
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because the NBA guarantees that players receive a percentage of the NBA’s “gross
revenues,” which include gate receipts, local and national television and radio revenue
and preseason and postseason revenue. 49
The presence of substitute professional opportunities for male basketball players
has impacted the relationship between the two bargaining units. To illustrate, the
NBPA enjoyed considerable bargaining power during the late 1960s, when the
American Basketball Association, a now defunct rival of the NBA, pursued NBA
players. The pursuit led to a more competitive market for player employment and
more bargaining power for the NBPA. 50
As recently discussed by Professor Marc Edelman, a burgeoning international
market for men’s basketball might yield similar bargaining enhancements for NBA
players. 51 Indeed, over the last several years, there has been an increase in
international basketball opportunities offering compensation comparable to that of
the NBA. 52 Several U.S. players have even selected contracts to play on European
teams instead of NBA teams. 53 In recent years the NBA has lost between 9% and
15% of its players to foreign teams, according to Edelman. 54 Unrestrained by salary
caps, international teams may soon pursue the NBA’s very best players with offers
that, in terms of financial compensation, far exceed what NBA teams can offer under
the league’s salary cap. 55
C. The Collaboration and Competition of the NBA
In negotiating with the NBPA, and more generally in its operations, the NBA
considers the sometimes collaborative, but sometimes competing, interests of NBA
owners and their franchises. To be sure, NBA owners must agree on certain rules
and procedures in order to operate a functional sports league. Game rules are an
See Alan Greenberg, NBA Closed Until Dec.1, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 29, 1998, at C1.
See Daniel M. Faber, The Evolution of Techniques for Negotiation of Sports Employment Contracts in
the Era of the Agent, 10 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 165, 176 (1993); see also Robert I.
Lockwood, The Best Interests of the League: Referee Betting Scandal Brings Commissioner Authority and
Collective Bargaining Back to the Frontcourt in the NBA, 15 SPORTS LAW. J. 137, 149 (2008)
(discussing how presence of ABA promoted bargaining leverage for NBA players).
51 See Marc Edelman, Does the NBA Still Have “Market Power?” Exploring the Implications of an
Increasingly Global Market for Men’s Basketball Player Labor, 41 RUTGERS L.J. (forthcoming 2010).
Given that European basketball leagues are not restricted by salary caps, some commentators
have mused that European teams will eventually present star NBA star players with
employment offers that more than double their potential earnings in the NBA. See, e.g., Marc
J. Spears, Europe Can Reach for Stars: Top NBA Talent May Be Lured Over, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug.
10, 2008, at C6 (discussing possible employment offers for Kobe Bryant and LeBron James).
52 See, e.g., Pete Thamel, A Top Prospect Picks Europe Over High School and College, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 23, 2009, at B14.
53 Sekou Smith, Childress Headed Back to Greece, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 15, 2009, at 1C
(mentioning Josh Childress and Jannero Pargo choosing to play in Europe).
54 See Edelman, supra note 51.
55 See Spears, supra note 51.
49
50
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obvious example of necessary collaboration; schedules and types of permissible
equipment are others. 56
Owners also agree on operational devices that, while not “necessary” for NBA
basketball, nonetheless advance the league’s collective interests. For instance, NBA
owners agree on a salary cap and an entry draft as means of promoting parity, even
though some teams would benefit from the capacity to spend more on players’
salaries or to sign any amateur player. 57
They also choose to equally own and employ a separate corporate entity, NBA
Properties, for the exclusive licensing of member teams’ intellectual property rights. 58
NBA Properties, which shares revenue evenly among the teams, 59 is clearly not
essential for NBA basketball: NBA teams previously chose to license their own
intellectual property, and could choose to do so again. 60 Nevertheless, because of

Cf. Michael S. Jacobs & Ralph K. Winter, Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining by Athletes:
Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L. J. 1, 28 (1971) (reasoning that while individual owners may
disagree about particular rules, owners collectively deem those rules necessary for generating
league product). As a point of distinction, owners may lack collective accord on the necessity
of regulating game styles. In Major League Baseball, for instance, Commissioner Bud Selig
recently encouraged teams to accelerate the pace of games. Teams which encourage batters to
take pitches—and thus wear out pitchers but also prolong games—are especially encouraged
to reconsider their style of play. At least one of those teams, the New York Yankees, appears
resistant to changing an approach which has generally proven successful. See Ben Walker,
Playoff Sked, Pace of Game Draw MLB Attention, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 19, 2010, at
http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/35955310/ns/sports-baseball/.
57 Marc J. Yoskowitz, Note, A Confluence of Labor and Antitrust Law: The Possibility of Union
Decertification in the National Basketball Association to Avoid the Bounds of Labor Law and Move into the
Realm of Antitrust, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 579, 631 (“The salary cap does not allow the
wealthier, larger market teams to create league-wide domination by offering exponentially
higher salaries, more attractive locales in which to play, and greater endorsement
opportunities”).
58 MARK CONRAD, THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS: A PRIMER FOR JOURNALISTS 268 (2006); see also
Abib Tejan Conteh, The Right of Publicity in Sports: Athletic and Economic Competition, 3 DEPAUL J.
SPORTS L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 136, 150 (2006) (noting that NBA Properties “is responsible for
licensing all forms of fan memorabilia, including replica and authentic team jerseys and
apparel, and other souvenirs, such as ‘bobbleheads’ and calendars.”); Brief of Amici Curiae
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n & Nat'l Basketball Ass’n Props. in Support of the Respondents, Am.
Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 129 S. Ct. 2859 (2009) (No. 08-661), at 2–3 [hereinafter
NBA Amici Curiae Brief] (noting that NBA Properties is equally owned by the thirty NBA
teams).
59 See ROSNER & SHROPSHIRE, supra note 31, at 185 (supplying additional background on NBA
Properties’ sharing of revenue).
60 See NBA Properties, Inc., BUS. WEEK, at
http://investing.businessweek.com/research/
stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=4762333 (last visited Feb. 21, 2010) (noting that NBA
Properties was founded in 1967—some twenty-seven years after the NBA was formed). NBA
Properties enjoys its collective licensing power because each NBA team contractually grants
NBA Properties the exclusive right to license most of its intellectual property. The intellectual
property, therefore, belong to the teams and is only obtained by NBA Properties through the
56
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their collaborative philosophy, NBA owners deem NBA Properties to be a more
advantageous arrangement than individualized licensing ventures.
Similarly, unlike competitors, NBA franchises share certain forms of revenue,
including revenue generated by national TV contracts and licensing contracts, without
regard for individual teams’ contributions. 61 They also embrace a democratic form of
rule: the NBA utilizes a Board of Governors, which consists of one representative of
each NBA franchise and which, pursuant to the NBA’s Constitution, determines the
league’s business and policy decisions. 62 Furthermore, with various powers assented
to by each NBA franchise, the NBA commissioner very much serves as a centralizing
force over NBA teams. 63
In other ways, however, NBA owners better resemble competitors. Each NBA
game seemingly proves that, as NBA games appear to be genuinely competitive
contests between teams that seek to defeat one another. Competition is also
detectable in the off-season, when teams compete for free agents, to make trades, and
to draft the most talented amateur players so as to improve themselves (as opposed to
the league). 64
In fairness, though, some have questioned the true competitiveness of NBA
games and of the NBA in general. Consider allegations by disgraced former NBA
referee Tim Donaghy, who recently completed a prison term for his mafia-induced
role in fixing NBA games. 65 Though his allegations have not been corroborated with
persuasive evidence, 66 and though his credibility is highly dubious, Donaghy charges
that “top executives of the NBA sought to manipulate games using referees.” 67

assent of those teams. Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. Partnership v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 754 F.
Supp. 1336, 1339 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
61 ROBERT F. REILLY & ROBERT P. SCHWEIHS, HANDBOOK OF ADVANCED BUSINESS
VALUATION 374 (1999).
62 Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 526 (7th Cir. 1986).
63 See Jeffrey Standen, The Beauty of Bets: Wagers as Compensation for Professional Athletes, 42
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 639, 649 n.43 (discussing powers of the NBA commissioner to regulate
gambling activities).
64 E.g., DONALD H. BROWN, A BEST OF BASKETBALL STORY 105 (2007) (discussing
competition among NBA teams for the employment services of Gilbert Arenas in the 2003
offseason).
65 Phil Taylor, Why is the NBA Getting a Pass in Donaghy, Referee Scandal?, SI.COM, Dec. 9, 2009,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2009/writers/phil_taylor/12/08/donaghy/index.html.
66 While Donaghy’s accusations have not been proven, some NBA players and commentators
believe there is truth behind them. See, e.g., Steve Bulpett, Celtics Beat: Ref’s Foul Language,
BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 9, 2009, at 64 (quoting Celtic Rasheed Wallace who claims that “now
the truth is coming out”); Wallace Matthews, Stern, Take Donaghy Seriously, NEWSDAY, Dec. 8,
2009, at A71 (opining that Commissioner Stern would be mistaken to presume that Donaghy
is necessarily lying).
67 Letter from John F. Lauro to Carol Bagley Amnon, Judge, U.S. District Court E.D.N.Y., Re:
U.S. v. Timothy Donaghy, June 10, 2008, available at http://assets.espn.go.com/media/pdf/
080610/donaghy03.pdf; see also TIM DONAGHY, PERSONAL FOUL: A FIRST-PERSON ACCOUNT
OF THE SCANDAL THAT ROCKED THE NBA (2009) (expounding upon the accusations).
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Donaghy’s depiction of the NBA would lead one to believe that the
competitiveness of NBA games bears some familiarity to the competitiveness of
professional wrestling matches, where the outcomes are pre-determined and much of
the “contest” is scripted and choreographed. 68 Unlike in the professional wrestling
context, however, where both wrestlers and wrestling fans understand the scripted
elements of their sport, neither NBA players nor NBA fans would be aware of their
“script.” In theory, both could pursue legal actions against the NBA. Players could
refer to obligations of good faith in collective bargaining 69 and to general contract law
principles that make contracts, such as the NBA’s Uniform Player Contract, voidable
on grounds of fraud and misrepresentation. 70 Patrons of NBA games and
merchandise, in turn, enjoy protection from false advertising and deception under
consumer fraud statutes. 71
A less damaging, and perhaps more observable, accusation implicating the
competitiveness of NBA games concerns the “tanking” phenomenon, where NBA
teams with poor records arguably have incentives to lose games in order to secure a
better position in the NBA draft. 72 M.L. Carr, the former head coach, executive vice
president, and director of basketball operations for the Boston Celtics, implied that
the Celtics tanked games in the 1996–97 season hoping to draft Wake Forest

Nathaniel Grow, A Proper Analysis of the National Football League Under Section One of the
Sherman Act, 9 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 281, 287 (2008) (discussing the feigned
competitiveness of professional wrestling).
69 See Thomas Brophy, Casenote, Icing the Competition: The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption and the
Conspiracy between the NHL and OHL in NHLPA v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 14 VILL.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 31 (2007) (discussing argument by NHL players that NHL failed to
bargain CBA in good faith).
70 Jason R. Marshall, Fired in the NBA! Terminating Vin Baker’s Contract: A Case-Study in Collective
Bargaining, Guaranteed Contracts, Arbitration, and Disability Claims in the NBA, 12 SPORTS LAW. J.
1, 33 (2005) (discussing role of misrepresentation in an NBA player contract); see also Patrick J.
Kelley, A Critical Analysis of Holmes’s Theory of Contract, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1681, 1715
(2000) (discussing grounds for voidable contract). But see National Basketball Association
Uniform Player Contract § 19 (releasing NBA and NBA teams from any and all claims by
player during the term of his contract).
71 Cf. Paul Finkelman, Fugitive Baseballs and Abandoned Property: Who Owns the Home Run Ball?, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 1609, 1625 (2002) (discussing how Major League Baseball and its franchises
could commit fraud by advertising that fans can keep home run balls but then confiscating
those balls under certain circumstances); Christopher T. Pickens, Comment, Of Bookies and
Brokers: Are Sports Futures Gambling or Investing, and Does it Even Matter?, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV.
227, 267 (2006) (discussing illegality of point shaving, where teams alter the outcome of games
in order to advance a party’s betting interests).
72 See, e.g., Ian Thomsen, NBA Looking to Prevent Tanking, SI.COM, Oct. 28, 2009,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2009/writers/ian_thomsen/10/28/tanking/index.html;
Michael McCann, The Pursuit of Crappyness: Are NBA Teams Tanking Games for Greg Oden and
Kevin Durant?, SPORTS LAW BLOG, Apr. 5, 2007, http://sports-law.blogspot.com/2007/04/
pursuit-of-crappyness-nba-teams-tanking.html.
68
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University star Tim Duncan with the first pick in the 1997 draft. 73 Still, the prevailing
view is that NBA games are competitive contests between competing NBA teams.
Moreover, even if tanking impacts some games, teams—eyeing better draft
position—appear to act as selfish actors when engaged in tanking. 74 “Tanking” can
thus be viewed as selfish and competitive behavior, with teams competing, rather than
cooperating, to lose for their own self-interest.
There are less obvious ways in which NBA teams compete, or refrain from
collaborating, and they illuminate why NBA owners approach league economic issues
from different lenses. For instance, while NBA teams share national TV and licensing
revenue, they do not share their local TV revenue or gate revenue; 75 in fact, teams
only share approximately 25% of all revenue. 76 To illustrate the revenue significance
of teams retaining gate receipts, consider that while the average ticket price to Los
Angeles Lakers games is $93, the average ticket price for Memphis Grizzlies games is
“just” $24. 77 Not surprisingly, the Lakers, with a net worth of $607 million, 78 are
worth considerably more the Grizzlies, which are valued at $257 million. 79
Moreover, though NBA owners have generally remained a cohesive group over
the course of the league’s history, 80 individual owners have, on occasion, sued or
73 Mark Cofman, Celtics Dismiss Outspoken Carr, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 1, 2001, at 84
(describing the Celtics trying to lose games as part of an “orchestration”).
74 See McCann, The Pursuit of Crappyness, supra note 72 (noting that both the Boston Celtics and
Milwaukee Bucks may have tried to lose a game they played against one another toward the
end of the 2006–07 season).
75 See Timothy R. Deckert, Casenotes: Multiple Characterizations for the Single Entity Argument?: The
Seventh Circuit Throws an Airball in Chicago Professional Sports Limited Partnership v. National
Basketball Association, 5 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 73, 100 (1998) (noting that NBA teams
keep 94% of gate receipts, with the remaining 6% allocated to the NBA, and also generally
keep their local television revenue); ZIMBALIST, supra note 31, at 575; ROSNER & SHROPSHIRE,
supra note 31, at 363 (describing how the sharing of revenue promotes financial stability in a
league).
76 See PROFESSIONAL SPORTS: THE CHALLENGES FACING THE FUTURE OF THE INDUSTRY:
HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, U.S. SENATE 64 (1996) (quoting
sports economist Andrew Zimbalist); Anthony Schoettle, NBA Revenue-Sharing Plan Could Save
Pacers, INDIANAPOLIS BUS. J., June, 2, 2008, at 5 (a more recent source, also quoting sports
economist Andrew Zimbalist).
77 Andrew Ungvari, Another NBA Lockout?: Where That Probably Isn’t the Best Idea Happens,
BLEACHER REPORT, Aug. 6, 2009, http://www.bleacherreport.com/articles/231404-isanother-nba-lockout-inevitable.
78 Kurt Badenhausen et al., NBA Team Valuation: Los Angeles Lakers, FORBES.COM, Dec. 9,
2009,
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2009/32/basketball-values-09_Los-Angeles-Lakers_
320250.html.
79 Kurt Badenhausen et al., NBA Team Valuation: Memphis Grizzlies, FORBES.COM, Dec. 9,
2009,
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2009/32/basketball-values-09_Memphis-Grizzlies_
325603.html.
80 E.g., Owners Make News on Revenue, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Nov. 26, 2006, at D06
(observing that “NBA owners, unlike their brethren in pro football and baseball, have been
remarkably disciplined over the years in maintaining their silence on just about every issue.”).
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threatened to sue the league. This was most notably seen in Chicago Professional Sports
Ltd. Partnership. v. NBA, 81 a litigation brought by the owners of the Chicago Bulls in
response to the NBA’s Board of Governors adopting resolutions that limited the
autonomy of individual teams to enter into television contracts. 82 Less contentious,
some owners of NBA teams which generate relatively limited amounts of unshared
revenue (e.g., local broadcasting revenue; gate receipts; luxury box revenue) have
complained that they are unfairly positioned when competing with more prosperous
teams. 83 In addition, several NBA owners have approached their equity stakes in
NBA franchises with idiosyncrasies, seeming more like advocates for their teams than
devotees to league orders. Dallas Mavericks owner Mark Cuban, who has
encountered frequent disagreements with the NBA and Commissioner Stern, is
perhaps the paradigmatic example. 84 Owners also vary in their public persona and
management style, with some taking a more hands-on, visibly competitive approach. 85
In sum, there are areas of cooperation and competition evident throughout the
NBA, a combination which has likely contributed to the league’s success while also
revealing the league as one comprised of sometimes unitary and sometimes divergent
actors.
III. THE NBA AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW
The business operations of the NBA, and the related interplay between
collaboration and competition, bear on how federal antitrust law should regard the
NBA.
A. The NBA as a Joint Venture
Courts have traditionally regarded the NBA and similar professional sports
leagues as joint ventures, 86 which are associations of “two or more persons formed to

95 F.3d 593, 593 (7th Cir. 1996).
ROSNER & SHROPSHIRE, supra note 31, at 154–55; see also infra Part II.B.
83 Owners Make News on Revenue, supra note 80.
84 See BILL SIMMONS, THE BOOK OF BASKETBALL: THE NBA ACCORDING TO THE SPORTS
GUY 164 (2009) (referencing imperfect relationship between Cuban and Stern).
85 See, e.g., JACK RAMSEY, DR. JACK'S LEADERSHIP LESSONS LEARNED FROM A LIFETIME IN
BASKETBALL 25 (2000) (describing most NBA owners as “removed from the scene”).
86 E.g., Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 961 F.2d 667, 673 (7th Cir.
1992) (reasoning that the court will “treat the NBA as a joint venture”); Levin v. Nat’l
Basketball Ass’n, 385 F. Supp. 149, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (concluding that the NBA is a joint
venture because the NBA’s own constitution makes such a conclusion); Fishman v. Wirtz, No.
74-2814, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9998 at *12 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (regarding the NBA Board of
Governors as evidence of the NBA being a joint venture); Lemat Corp. v. Barry, 275 Cal. App.
2d 671, 673 (Ct. App. 1969) (concluding that the NBA is a joint venture because of its
business operations); cf. N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat’l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1251
(2d Cir. 1992) (characterizing the NFL as a joint venture); cf. Major League Baseball Props.,
81
82
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carry out a single business enterprise for profit for which purpose they combine their
property, money, effects, skill, and knowledge.” 87 Leagues are viewed as joint
ventures because a competitive, team-based sporting event necessarily requires
multiple—and distinct—teams and some level of cooperation among those teams. 88
Joint ventures are not unique to professional sports. They exist in fields as
diverse as stock exchanges, credit card networks, 89 trade associations, 90 and so-called
“independent practice associations” among physicians. 91 Joint ventures arise when
competitors align in order to achieve certain business goals, and they normally involve
resource pooling and risk sharing. 92
Joint ventures are most likely subject to section 1 scrutiny. 93 The rationale is
straightforward: joint ventures involve integration and risk sharing among distinct and
competing entities. 94 Such cooperation can limit or reduce competition, an outcome
which, on its surface, may frustrate the goals of section 1 and impede the prevention
of collaborations that impair competition or harm consumers. 95 The normal type of
section 1 scrutiny for joint ventures is rule of reason, which entails a weighing of proand anti-competitive effects of a particular collaboration. 96 Under rule of reason
scrutiny, collaboration is deemed unlawful only if its anti-competitive effects are
Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 337–38 (2d Cir. 2008) (identifying Major League Baseball
Properties as a joint venture).
87 46 AM. JUR. 2D Joint Ventures § 1 (2006) (supplying a commonly-accepted, though not
exclusive, definition of joint ventures). But see, Daniel E. Lazaroff, The Antitrust Implications of
Franchise Relocation Restrictions in Professional Sports, 53 FORDHAM L. REV., 157, 196–97 (1984)
(noting that some antitrust scholars narrowly define joint ventures as temporary relationships).
For a thoughtful discussion of professional sports leagues as joint ventures, see Thomas A.
Piraino, Jr., A Proposal for the Antitrust Regulation of Professional Sports, 79 B.U. L. REV. 889, 920–
31 (1999).
88 For a more complete discussion, see McCann, Opportunity to Reshape Sports Law, supra note 3,
at 738.
89 See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Approach to Collaborations Among Competitors, 86
IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1173 (2001).
90 See Alvin F. Lindsay, III, Comment, Tuning in to HDTV: Can Production Joint Ventures Improve
America’s High-Tech Picture?, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1159, 1168, n.49 (1990).
91 See Micah Berman, Note, The “Quality Health Care Coalition Act”: Can Antitrust Law Improve
Patient Care?, 53 STAN. L. REV. 695, 706 (2000) (discussing how physicians integrate part of
their practices, while otherwise remaining competitors, in independent practice associations);
Piraino, A Proposed Antitrust Approach to Collaborations Among Competitors, supra note 89, at 1173.
92 See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr. Reconciling the Per Se and Rule of Reason Approaches to Antitrust
Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 685, 725 (1991).
93 See Darren Bush & Salvatore Massa, Rethinking the Potential Competition Doctrine, 2004 WIS. L.
REV. 1035, 1097 (2004).
94 See Frederic J. Entin et al., Hospital Collaboration: The Need for An Appropriate Antitrust Policy, 29
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 107, 114 (1994); N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat’l Football League, 670
F.2d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir. 1982).
95 Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
96 See Gordon H. Copland & Pamela E. Hepp, Government Antitrust Enforcement in the Health Care
Markets: The Regulators Need an Update, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 101, 106–07 (1996).
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dominant. 97 To better characterize these labels, an anti-competitive effect would
describe a deprivation of competition in the marketplace when otherwise competing
entities act as a joint venture; a pro-competitive effect, in contrast, would describe the
market efficiencies generated by the joint venture. 98
Even though they evince cooperation among competitors, some types of
collaboration among sports teams easily pass rule of reason analysis. Field
dimensions and scoring methods, for instance, are viewed as predominantly procompetitive. 99 These basic types of understandings are essential for there to be
competitive games; if the Boston Celtics and New York Knicks disagreed on whether
travelling with the basketball is allowed or disallowed, they would not be able to play
each other, no matter how talented their rosters. 100
Off-field restraints on competition, however, have normally been regarded as
predominantly anti-competitive. To illustrate, in Chicago Professional Sports, 101 the
Seventh Circuit considered an NBA rule that prevented NBA teams from
broadcasting on a “superstation”—a local broadcast station that is nationally
distributed by cable and satellite systems—games that were not part of a national TV
contract. In the Seventh Circuit’s view, the district court did not commit reversible
error when it found that the NBA’s attempt to prevent potential competition between
games broadcast by a team on the superstation and games nationally broadcast by the
NBA would pose a greater anti-competitive harm than pro-competitive benefit. 102
B. The NBA’s Aspirations for Single Entity Recognition:
The Role of American Needle v. NFL
While courts have repeatedly classified the NBA as a joint venture, 103 the NBA
hopes the Supreme Court’s forthcoming decision in American Needle will provide a
new playbook for antitrust litigation. 104 American Needle concerns whether the NFL
Id.
See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (discussing how courts
regard anti-competitive effects); see also Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of
Reason, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 77 (applying the rule of reason to various joint ventures).
99 See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984) (“‘[Some]
activities can only be carried out jointly. Perhaps the leading example is league sports.’”)
(quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 278
(1978)).
100 Literally, they could play each other, but their games would not be competitive contests.
101 Chicago Prof’l Sports, Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n (Bulls I), 961 F.2d 667, 669 (7th
Cir. 1992).
102 Id. at 672–74. But see Molinas v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 190 F. Supp. 241, 243–44 (S.D.N.Y.
1961) (court found that the NBA suspension of a player who bet on games in which he was
playing passed rule of reason, since it was deemed both reasonable and necessary for a sports
league that requires genuine competition).
103 See cases cited supra note 86.
104 The NBA has filed an amicus brief in support of the NFL. See NBA Amici Curiae Brief,
supra note 58.
97
98
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and its teams should be considered “one” entity for purposes of section 1 of the
Sherman Act. 105 As one entity—a single entity—the NFL and its often competing
teams could be considered distinct corporate entities that nonetheless share a
“corporate consciousness.” The expression “corporate consciousness” is a product
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 106 where
the Court held that parents and wholly owned subsidiaries cannot violate section 1 in
their collaborations. 107 The Court reasoned that since a parent can, at any time, take
control of a wholly owned subsidiary, the latter is akin to a division of the former—
rather than an autonomous entity—and that therefore, any collaboration between the
two does not warrant section 1 scrutiny. 108 Although some lower courts have
extended single entity recognition to business entities with weaker relationships, 109
many have not. 110
American Needle is on appeal from the Seventh Circuit, which held that the NFL
and its teams are a single entity for purposes of licensing. 111 The Seventh Circuit
reasoned that individual NFL franchises, by voluntarily choosing to bargain their
licensing contracts through a separate and shared entity—NFL Properties—were
cooperating in order to compete as a league against other entertainment providers. 112
As a consequence, their collaboration on licensing constituted behavior by a single
entity, rather than by competitors. The Seventh Circuit declined to opine on the
availability of the single entity defense outside of the context of licensing, though it
did suggest that single entity issues in professional sports be determined “‘one league
at a time . . . [and] . . . one facet of a league at a time.’” 113 The Seventh Circuit also
intimated that matters concerning labor, which are the subject of collective
bargaining, 114 would be ill-suited for single entity recognition. 115
105 See generally, McCann, An Opportunity to Reshape Sports Law, supra note 3; see also Michael
McCann, Why American Needle v. NFL is Most Important Case in Sports History, SI.COM, Jan. 12,
2010,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/michael_mccann/01/12/american
needlev.nfl/index.html.
106 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
107 Id. at 777.
108 Id. at 770–72.
109 See, e.g., Williams v. Nevada, 794 F. Supp. 1026, 1034 (D. Nev. 1992) (recognizing a single
entity between a fast food franchisor and its separately owned franchisees).
110 See Ryan P. Meyers, Comment, Partial Ownership of Subsidiaries, Unity of Purpose, and Antitrust
Liability, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1401, 1407–14 (2001) (noting various courts’ applications of
Copperfield).
111 American Needle Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 744 (7th Cir. 2008), cert.
granted, 174 L. Ed. 2d 575 (2009).
112 Id. For additional discussion of the Seventh Circuit’s opinion, see McCann, An Opportunity to
Reshape Sports Law, supra note 3.
113 American Needle, 538 F.3d at 742 (quoting Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v.
National Basketball Ass’n (Bulls II), 95 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir. 1996)).
114 See supra Part I.B.
115 American Needle, 538 F.3d at 741–42 (“[I]ndividuals seeking employment with any of the
league’s teams would view the league as a collection of loosely affiliated companies that all
have the independent authority to hire and fire employees. That being said, we have
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The Seventh Circuit’s logic in American Needle may be criticized on several
grounds. Those grounds include the sometimes factionalized, far from unitary
relationship among NFL owners, most notably detected when Dallas Cowboys owner
Jerry Jones sued NFL Properties and his fellow owners under section 1. 116 Also, the
collaboration among NFL teams for licensing is not necessary—NFL teams
previously competed over apparel and merchandise sales. 117 Along those lines,
though it would be audacious to predict the Supreme Court’s decision based on their
questions posed during the January 13, 2010 oral argument, several Justices seemed
unconvinced by the NFL’s reasoning and, by implication, the Seventh Circuit’s
reasoning. 118
Until the Seventh Circuit’s decision in American Needle, the single entity argument
had failed repeatedly for professional sports leagues. 119 Teams with independent
ownership, and which compete in numerous and self-interested ways, were viewed as
materially different from a parent and wholly-owned subsidiary. 120 Such a deduction
was even found in the context of Major League Soccer (“MLS”), which owned MLS
franchises and furnished them with only limited autonomy. 121 In Fraser v. Major
League Soccer, 122 the First Circuit categorized MLS as a “hybrid arrangement” between

nevertheless embraced the possibility that a professional sports league could be considered a
single entity under [Copperweld].” (internal citation omitted)).
116 See Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd. v. Nat’l Football League Trust, No. 95-9426, 1996
WL 601705 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 1996); see also McCann, An Opportunity to Reshape Sports Law,
supra note 3, at 759–61 (discussing section 1 litigation by Dallas Cowboys and its owner, Jerry
Jones, against the NFL and NFL Properties).
117 See McCann, An Opportunity to Reshape Sports Law, supra note 3, at 759.
118 Both Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Stephen Breyer, for instance, questioned the
plausibility and sensibility of trying to distinguish when the NFL acts as a single entity and a
joint venture, when restraints of trade that satisfy rule of reason would do so. See Official
Transcript of American Needle v. NFL, No. 08-661, Jan. 13, 2010, available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-661.pdf.
119 See, e.g., Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1099 (1st Cir. 1994); N. Am. Soccer
League v. Nat’l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1257–58 (2d Cir. 1982); Nat’l Hockey League
Players Ass’n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 419 F.3d 462, 469–70 (6th Cir. 2005); and
L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1387–90 (9th Cir.
1984);
120 See, e.g., L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n, 726 F.2d at 1390 (describing how in the NFL,
“profits and losses are not shared, a feature common to partnerships or other ‘single
entities’”).
121 See Marc Edelman, Why the “Single Entity” Defense Can Never Apply to NFL Clubs: A Primer on
Property-Rights Theory in Professional Sports, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 891,
900–03 (2008) (describing Major League Soccer’s original “league-based common property
system”—which called for, inter alia, central ownership of the soccer teams by the league and
the equal sharing of profits by the leagues’ “investor-controllers”—and its subsequent
abandonment).
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a single entity and joint venture, but one that was still subject to rule of reason
scrutiny. 123
If the Supreme Court chooses to characterize the NFL as a single entity, the NBA
would certainly attempt to gain from the recognition. 124 For instance, if the Court
were to endorse the Seventh Circuit’s recognition of single entity status for purposes
of NFL licensing, the NBA would be poised to argue that it receive comparable
protection. After all, the NBA and NFL are similarly structured and their respective
licensing entities—NBA Properties and NFL Properties—each negotiate licenses on
behalf of all teams and each equally distribute the earnings among those teams. 125
NBA licensing for apparel and possibly other products, including video games, would
thus be exempt from section 1, even if an exclusive licensing contract between the
NBA and a licensed company raised prices or disappointed consumers. 126
Though unlikely, the Court could alternatively find that the NFL constitutes a
complete single entity in all facets of its business operation, meaning the NFL could
unilaterally impose labor conditions on NFL players. 127 Given the NBA’s difficult
collective bargaining with the NBPA, the ability to unilaterally impose salary restraints
and other employment restrictions would be of great attraction to the league. 128 It
would also empower the NBA to impose a sought-after elevated age eligibility
restriction, 129 the current version of which requires that an amateur player of U.S.
origin be at least nineteen years old on December 31 of the year of the NBA draft and
that at least one NBA season must have passed between when the player graduated
from high school, or when he would have graduated from high school, and the NBA
draft. 130 The Court could also reverse the Seventh Circuit, subjecting the NFL, and
by implication similar leagues, to the traditional mode of analysis for joint venture
behavior: rule of reason.
C. Does the NBA Have a Stronger Argument for Single Entity
Recognition than the NFL?
As evidenced by their status as national sports leagues with independent team
ownership, powerful commissioners, bargaining relationships with a players’
Id. at 58.
The NBA’s filing of an amicus brief in the case is suggestive of its interest in the outcome.
See NBA Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 58.
125 See CONRAD, supra note 58, at 268; ROSNER & SHROPSHIRE, supra note 31, at 184–85.
126 The potential danger of such exclusive video game contracts can be seen with the NFL’s
such contract with Electronic Arts, which has drawn criticism for its impact on prices and
quality. See McCann, Opportunity to Reshape Sports Law, supra note 3, at 764–66.
127 See id. at 766–68.
128 See supra Part I.B.
129 See Howard Beck, From Preps to the Pinnacle of the N.B.A., N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2009, at B15
(discussing NBA’s desire to raise the age limit to twenty years of age, a desire opposed by the
NBPA).
130 See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. X, § 1(b)(i), available at
http://www.nbpa.org/sites/default/files/ARTICLE%20X.pdf.
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association, and combinations of collaboration and competition in their business
practices, the NFL and NBA are clearly similar. But they are dissimilar in ways which
may suggest that the viability of the single entity defense for one may not determine
that for the other.
Consider the extent of revenue sharing among the two leagues. NFL teams share
approximately 90 percent of their revenues, 131 while NBA teams—which, unlike the
NFL, do not divide revenue from local TV broadcasts or gate receipts—share only
about 25 percent of their revenues. 132 The NFL’s emphasis on sharing would likely
require owners to “share consciousness” at a higher level than NBA owners who,
from a domestically-oriented financial standpoint, appear more self-autonomous.
Other factors, however, posit the NBA more as a single entity. Take the level of
cooperation required of team owners for the creation and development of subsidiary
leagues. While NBA owners have closely collaborated on the WNBA, D-League, and
NBA China, NFL owners have pursued subsidiary leagues with less interest and
questionable esprit de corps. The respective success of the NFL and NBA in using
subsidiary leagues to export their products is particularly illustrative of this point.
The NFL has encountered significant obstacles in generating sustained
international interest in “American football.” Most notably, from 1991 to 2007, the
NFL owned and operated NFL Europe (also called World League of American
Football, World League, and NFL Europa). 133 NFL Europe featured between six and
10 teams each season, with teams stationed in such cities as Barcelona, Amsterdam,
and Berlin. 134 Although NFL Europe attracted viable fan bases in certain locations, 135
it reportedly lost $30 million a year. 136 A leading reason for its failure was the refusal
of most NFL teams—and their owners—to follow NFL directives that teams use
NFL Europe for player development. 137 Acting instead in self-interested and entirely
rational ways—most NFL teams declined to send their promising and young, but not
yet ready for the NFL, players to NFL Europe. 138 Teams surmised that those players
would develop faster if they worked with NFL coaches and practiced against
seasoned NFL players. 139 In lieu of sending those promising players to NFL Europe,

Comment, Leveling the Playing Field: Relevant Product Market Definition in Sports Franchise
Relocation Cases, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 245, 254 n.48 (2000).
132 See supra note 75 and accompanying text; see also Howard Beck, Amid a Downturn, the N.B.A.
Union Is Willing to Talk, Not Surrender, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23 2009, at B16 (noting limitations of
sharing among NBA teams).
133 See Sandomir, supra note 12.
134 See id.
135 See David Elfin, NFL Bags European League, WASH. TIMES, June 30, 2007, at C1 (noting that
NFL Europe had “record attendance” in its final year).
136 See Bryan Burrwell, Please, World, Let Americans be Indifferent to Pro Soccer, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, July 17, 2009, at D1.
137 See Len Pasquarelli, NFL Europa Failed to Produce Players, Profits, ESPN.COM, June 29, 2007,
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teams usually sent marginal players, thereby providing European fans with inferior
American football. 140
The failure of NFL Europe has not dissuaded the NFL from seeking other ways
of promoting its product abroad. Indeed, since 2007, the NFL has played both
exhibition and regular season games abroad, including in Mexico City and London,
and with sold out attendances and great fanfare. 141 There are skeptics, however, as to
whether “American football” will ever catch on outside the United States, particularly
if—as shown in the NFL Europe experiment—NFL owners do not act as “one” in
facilitating the promotion of the game abroad. 142 In addition, the absence of top-level
American football professional leagues in other countries means that NFL owners are
not required to collaborate in responding to external competition for American
football. 143 In short, the NFL does not resemble a single entity in the context of
international endeavors; in fact, in some ways it resembles a coalition of the unwilling.
In contrast, and as discussed earlier in this Article, the NBA’s international
endeavors have proven far more successful. 144 The league’s considerable investment
in NBA China, coupled with its increasingly international business model and player
demographics, also suggest the NBA and its teams will experience a mounting
obligation to act as one. The NBA’s pursuit of marketing abroad has already required
sustained solidarity among NBA owners; to the extent international endeavors
continue to encompass rising portions of NBA investments, NBA owners may in fact
lose autonomy and be forced to defer to centralized league wishes.
Moreover, NBA teams now compete with international teams for U.S. and
international players’ services. 145 The presence of international competition with
bona fide rival basketball leagues possesses legal significance. Although the First
Circuit rejected MLS as a single entity in Fraser, it opined that the capacity of MLS
players to secure comparable employment in international leagues advanced the
MLS’s single entity argument. 146 In that same vein, as basketball grows in popularity
across the world, it stands to reason that superior alternatives to the NBA may
emerge. If so, NBA owners may have no choice but to act as one in competing with
those leagues. Such shared consciousness may necessitate that NBA teams pay
Id.; see also Neil D. Isaacs, Anniversary Offering, 25 J. SPORT LITERATURE 33 (2007) (discussing
how NFL Europe players were vastly inferior to NFL players and likely had little chance of
becoming NFL players); Mark Woods, Is NFL Europe Set to Fumble?, SCOT. ON SUNDAY, June
15, 2003, at 11 (providing local Scottish perspective of NFL Europe as a disappointing minor
league enterprise).
141 See Les Carpenter, Bringing Pigskin to Land of Ping-Pong, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2009, at A1.
142 See supra notes 137–40 and accompanying text.
143 Even in the domestic sphere, the NFL has no competition. The United Football League
(UFL), which began play in the fall of 2009, is unlikely to emerge as a competitor to the NFL,
as the UFL’s employment offers and ambitions appear to be more consistent with that of a
minor league, rather than a rival. See Doug Haller, Upstart League Moves Forward, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, June 17, 2009, at C7.
144 See supra Part I.B.
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146 Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47, 59, 63 (1st Cir. 2002).
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players higher salaries or charge less in merchandise and apparel, among other
possible outcomes.
To be sure, the cohesiveness demanded of the NBA in its international endeavors
would help insulate the league under rule of reason scrutiny. Collaboration is more
likely to be perceived as advancing competition if it is also perceived as necessary. 147
Therefore, in a section 1 challenge to NBA business dealings related to international
endeavors, the NBA would likely draw strength from the necessity of collaboration.
The harder question is whether such collaboration should influence the
characterization of the NBA and its teams as one entity or many entities aligned in a
joint venture. In some respects, the difference may prove immaterial. If an NBA
restraint of trade can easily pass rule of reason analysis, then an exemption from
section 1 would likely benefit the NBA only by providing relief from litigation costs
and costs associated with the possibility of section 1 litigation; the restraint would
remain compatible with section 1 either way. 148
Then again, exempting the NBA from section 1 scrutiny, such as through single
entity recognition, could pose unintended, but foreseeable problems. Perhaps
foremost, consider the constantly evolving relationship between leagues and their
teams, be it in revised formulas for revenue sharing, centralization of licensing
agreements, or one of many other transformations. If the NBA and its teams were
exempt from section 1 for a particular purpose—such as for international
endeavors—could entities still challenge the NBA and its teams under section 1 each
time the relationship for that purpose changes? Would the exemption remain valid for
certain changes but not others?
Along those lines, can leagues and their teams constitute a single entity for certain
purposes at a given moment revert to separate entities at a later time? In American
Needle, the NFL insists that it constitutes a single entity for sales of licensed apparel
even though one of its owners, Jerry Jones, previously sued his fellow owners under a
section 1 claim for the freedom to separately sell Cowboys’ apparel. 149 Presumably, at
the time Jones sued his fellow owners, the NFL and its teams were not a single entity
for sales of licensed apparel. Single entity recognition therefore may not supply a
professional sports league with continual protection from section 1 litigation.
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in American Needle asserts that
voluntary collaboration for purposes of competing as a league can give rise to single
entity recognition. 150 From that vantage point, the NBA’s international endeavors
would seem to furnish a strong case for such recognition, which the NBA, as shown
in its amicus brief in American Needle, clearly seeks. After all, unlike with professional
See, e.g., Hatley v. American Quarter Horse Ass’n, 552 F.2d 646, 652–54 (5th Cir. 1977)
(holding that under rule of reason analysis, necessary collaboration for registration rules are
essential for survival of sports enterprises).
148 Section 1 litigation can involve very high discovery costs. See Amber A. Pelot, Casenote,
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly: Mere Adjustment or Stringent New Requirement in Pleading?, 59
MERCER L. REV. 1371, 1387–88 (2008).
149 See supra Part II.B.
150 American Needle Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 744 (7th Cir. 2008), cert.
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football and baseball, there appears to be global competition among professional
basketball leagues for players and markets. Such competition may require the NBA to
compete as a league, with the obligation of individual NBA owners to follow suit.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in American Needle remains unknown at the time of
this writing. Based on existing conceptions of single entity analysis, however, while
the domestic operations of the NBA are clearly not more akin to a single entity than
those of the NFL, the league’s international operations—an increasingly significant
revenue dynamic for the NBA—portray the NBA more like a single actor. As the
NBA becomes a more globalized league, the significance of its international
operations and relationship to federal antitrust law could prove intriguing. Indeed,
the NBA’s globalized business agenda and exposure to competition from
international basketball leagues may necessitate that NBA teams act in harmony, at
least for international business endeavors. The failure of NFL teams to do so in their
NFL Europe endeavor seems to corroborate that point.
Furthermore, and as I argue elsewhere, regardless of how the Supreme Court
decides American Needle, Congress could use the lawmaking process to tailor section 1
to promote the competitiveness of professional sports leagues. 151 Namely, Congress
could consider targeted, sports-related exemptions from section 1 that recognize the
evolving nature of U.S. professional sports and their global stakes. Through periodic
legislative hearings, such exemptions could prove more durable and pliable than
judicially-crafted exemptions, which may be subject to litigation each time a change in
circumstances arises, thereby curtailing one of the exemptions’ primary benefits:
avoidance of section 1 litigation. For purposes of professional sports leagues, the
NBA may present the best case for exempting leagues from section 1 scrutiny in
matters related to international business.
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